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Abstract. The question whether Kant is a conceptualist has attracted significant attention of Kant scholars in 
recent decades. I present all three dominant positions in the debate (strong conceptualism, weak conceptualism, 
nonconceptualism) and argue that strong conceptualism and nonconceptualism are less plausible interpretations 
of Kant’s philosophy. I argue that the first cannot explain Kant’s commitments related to the incongruents, 
animals, and infants. The second one, meanwhile, cannot explain Kant’s argument on causation against Hume. 
At the end of the paper, I try to show that the key to a plausible and convincing interpretation of Kant as a 
weak conceptualist is the distinction between categories and empirical concepts.
Keywords: Kant, weak conceptualism, non-conceptualism, categories, empirical concepts 
 
Kodėl Kantas yra silpnasis konceptualistas
Santrauka. Klausimas, ar Kantas yra konceptualistas, yra vienas gausiausiai nagrinėtų Kanto studijų klausimų 
pastaraisiais dešimtmečiais. Aš pristatau tris šiuose debatuose dominuojančias pozicijas (stiprųjį konceptualizmą, 
silpnąjį konceptualizmą ir antikonceptualizmą) ir teigiu, kad stiprusis konceptualizmas ir antikonceptualizmas 
yra mažiau pagrįstos Kanto filosofijos interpretacijos. Teigiu, kad pirmasis negali paaiškinti Kanto įsiparei-
gojimų, susijusių su nekongruentiškais vaizdiniais bei gyvūnais ir kūdikiais, o antrasis – Kanto polemikos 
prieš Hume’ą. Straipsnio pabaigoje bandau parodyti, kad raktas į įtikinamą Kanto kaip silpnojo konceptualisto 
interpretaciją yra perskyra tarp kategorijų ir empirinių sąvokų.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Kantas, stiprusis konceptualizmas, antikonceptualizmas, silpnasis konceptualizmas, 
kategorijos, empirinės sąvokos 
Vilnius University Press
Received: 20/11/2018. Accepted: 18/03/2019
Copyright © Ruslanas Baranovas, 2019. Published by Vilnius University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
ISSN 1392-1126   eISSN 2424-6158   PROBLEMOS 95, 2019
82
The debate on conceptualism in the analytical philosophy prompted Kant scholars to 
ask whether Kant was a conceptualist in regard to experience. To explore this question, I 
will first present preliminary definitions of the main positions in the debate: strong con-
ceptualism, weak conceptualism, and nonconceptualism. Then, I will reconstruct these 
positions along the most common arguments they use, rather than relying on close reading 
of any single text. Finally, my aim is to show that weak conceptualist interpretation of Kant 
is preferable to the other two. At the end of the paper, I argue that the key to a plausible 
and convincing interpretation of Kant as a weak conceptualist is the distinction between 
categories and empirical concepts.
Preliminary Definitions
In the debate analyzed in this paper, conceptualism is usually defined as the claim that 
any perceptual experience is possible only if conceptual capacities are at work in that 
experience. Those who see Kant as a strong conceptualist, then, argue that, for Kant, the 
conceptual apparatus (first and foremost, categories) determines all content of experience 
(McDowell 1994; Land 2011; Ginsborg 2008). One possible motivation for this position 
is the fact that, in Kant, the only possible alternative source of determination is sensation. 
For a strong conceptualist, to claim that experience is determined by sensation would 
mean claiming that some mysterious and inexpressible givens, later somehow transformed 
into judgments expressed in language, determine the experience. At the beginning of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the distinction between form, which gives unity to 
the manifold in the intuition, and matter, which is given by the sensation (Kant 1998: 
155-6). As concrete finite subjects, we never confront pure matter of experience – all we 
ever come into contact with is always given to us in form. Those who posit Kant as a 
strong conceptualist claim exactly this, as they state that it is necessary to have the concept 
“tree” in order to experience concrete trees. For the strong conceptualist, the limits of 
my concepts are the limits of my world. Weak conceptualist makes a weaker claim. This 
interpretation claims that for Kant concepts always play a role in experience but do not 
necessarily define the whole perceptual content. For example, Luca Forgione claims, that 
“contrasted to McDowell’s strong conceptualism here the intuition makes a notionally 
separable representational contribution to cognition” (Forgione 2015: 58) and “in contrast 
to Allais’s non-conceptualism, this epistemic contribution cannot be realized without at 
least the concept of the transcendental object” (ibid).
It is easiest and best to define nonconceptualism as the opposite of conceptualist thesis, 
that for Kant conceptual apparatus always constitutes perceptual content of experience.1 
Non-conceptualist interpreters of Kant claim that perceptual experience is not determined 
by the subject’s conceptual capacities and that there is an essentially nonconceptual (with 
1  Like in many other debates between two alternatives, positions have a somewhat parasitical relationship. 
They look the best when they expose the weaknesses and absurdities of the other position. 
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regard to form or content) perceptual experience (Hanna 2008; 2011; 2016; Grüne 2011; 
Allais 2009). According to this interpretation, no conceptual capacities are required to 
intuit a tree – conceptual capacities are only added later, when meaningful judgments are 
formed. Viewing Kant from this position, it is possible to intuit a tree without conceptual 
capacities, although they are still needed to experience it. 
One can also summarize the debate as one between the autonomy of the senses 
(non-conceptualism) versus their dependency on conceptual apparatus (strong conceptu-
alism), with weak conceptualism taking the middle position. 
What Does the Text Say?
The debate whether Kant is a conceptualist is especially problematic because certain 
fragments of Kant’s writings seem to support each of the three interpretations.
For example, Kant’s dictum at the beginning of the first Critique states that “objects 
are therefore given to us by means of sensibility and it alone affords us intuitions; but they 
are thought through the understanding” (Kant 1998: 155). Whichever way one chooses to 
interpret this “givenness”, it seems quite certain that Kant is clear on distinguishing two 
stems of cognition and emphasizing the autonomy of sensibility. Moreover, Kant claims 
that “objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions 
of the understanding” (Kant 1998: 222). Autonomy and independence of sensibility are 
also implied in Kant’s comments in “Transcendental logic”, where he argues that “appear-
ances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires 
the functions of thinking” (Kant 1998: 223). However, Kant’s notions of the synthesis 
and imagination, “deduction of pure concepts of understanding”, and especially the so-
called B-deduction of the second edition, seem to point to the opposite direction. We 
even find him claiming explicitly that all sensible content is determined by categories: 
“Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands 
under the categories, and since experience is cognition though connected perceptions, the 
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are thus also valid a priori 
of all objects of experience” (Kant 1998: 262). All the seemingly contradictory accounts 
provided above come from the first Critique alone. The same fundamental ambiguity is 
also found in his pre-critical texts and in the Critique of Judgment. It appears that Kant 
has not resolved this tension even by his late and unfinished Selbstzetsungslehre. This may 
suggest that Kant himself does not recognize the problem, as no reflection on it appears 
in the entire Kantian oeuvre. 
This means that there is enough textual material to ground all three interpretations – but 
also that consulting textual evidence alone is not enough. The way to tackle this debate, 
then, is to find a way to interpret the central terms of Kantian philosophy – intuition, 
appearing, experience and concepts – in a coherent way while being faithful to Kant’s 
thought.
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Nonconceptual Content of Experience: Nonconceptualists’ Arguments
Nonconceptualist interpreters stress the separation of “the two stems of cognition”. In 
defending their interpretation, they mostly rely on the “Transcendental aesthetics” part 
of the first Critique. The nonconceptualist reading of Kant begins with establishing that 
intuition or sensibility is the first, independent, and self-sufficient basis of human cogni-
tion. As one of the leading nonconceptualist interpreters, Hanna emphasizes, “first, Kant 
says explicitly in the Critique of Pure Reason that intuitions of outer sense or inner sense, 
which pick out appearances—the undetermined objects of empirical intuitions (KrV: A20/
B34)—are possible for us independently of the functions of our understanding, that is, 
independently of our concepts” (Hanna 2016: 108). A certain picture emerges out of such 
emphasis on “Transcendental aesthetics”. Nonconceptualists tend to present Kant as de-
fending “layer-cake theory of mind”. Though they may not be keen to embrace this label, 
it is not unfair to their position. According to the “layer-cake theorist” Kant, first, we get 
intuitions through sensibility, which are later transformed by transcendental imagination 
according to the categories to constitute experience. From this, it follows that Kant can 
actually be read as a common-sense-respecting naturalist. Hanna puts this point clearly:
According to conceptualism, human minds are basically intellectual in character, having noth-
ing inherently to do with the embodied, sense-perceiving, affective, desiring, animal side 
of human nature. By contrast, according to (essentialist content) nonconceptualism, human 
minds are basically bound up with the embodied, sense-perceiving, affective, desiring, animal 
side of human nature, and are not basically intellectual in character. (Hanna 2016: 101-102)
Since Hanna takes the second description to be true about the world in general, for him, 
“Kant’s (essentialist content) nonconceptualism is foundational for any philosophically de-
fensible version of his transcendental idealism” (Hanna 2016: 104). While Hanna provides 
a relatively original extrinsic motivation for the nonconceptualist reading of Kant, many 
find nonconceptualism inherent to his philosophy simply because Kant needs to follow 
the nonconceptualist thesis so not to fall back into full-blown idealism. If even intuition 
is always already conceptual, what remains of Kant’s empiricist side? Nonconceptualists 
agree with van Mazijk, who claims that “Kant needs intuition to be non-conceptual to 
retain the critical function of the Critique” (van Mazijk 2014: 191).
Hands, Kids and Animals: Kant’s Nonconceptualist Commitments
Kant’s explicit commitments, when interpreted as nonconceptualist, play a great role in 
nonconceptualist arguments. The two most discussed examples in literature are related to 
animals and infants, and incongruents. My aim is to show that these commitments cannot 
be accounted for by interpretations of Kant as a strong conceptualist, although they could 
be by weak conceptualist interpretations. To do so, I will discuss both examples in turn. 
The nonconceptualist interpreter has to find Kant explicitly committing to the thesis 
that it is possible to intuit or perceive without the conceptual capacities being at work. 
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According to Hanna, one such example is Kant’s remarks on animals and infants. To Han-
na, “Kant explicitly claims in some pre-Critical writings and also Critical writings alike 
that at least some non-human animals (e.g. oxen) and some non-rational human animals 
(e.g. ordinary human infants) are capable of sense perception and thus capable of inner 
and outer sensory intuition, but do not possess conceptual capacities” (Hanna 2016: 108). 
One could argue that this does not prove anything because intuition in animal/infant case 
is qualitatively different to that of adult humans. Thus, Kant simply means something 
completely different by “intuitions”, “perceptions”, and “representation”, when he admits 
that animals and infants can have them. However, such a way out for a strong concep-
tualist is denied by Kant himself; as he writes in the “Critique of power of Judgement”, 
Yet from the comparison of the similar mode of operation in animals (the ground for which we 
cannot immediately perceive) to that of humans (of which we are immediately aware) we can 
quite properly infer in accordance with the analogy that animals also act in accordance with 
representations [Vorstellungen] (and are not, as Descartes would have it, machines), and that 
in spite of their specific difference, they are still of the same genus as human beings (as living 
beings). (Kant 2000: 328)
It is hard to see how this strong conceptualist interpretation can explain how infants 
and oxen can have perceptual experience in Kant’s system – to strong conceptualists this 
is impossible without concepts. A possible way out is to say that infants at least have a 
disposition to learn concepts and as such, have the concepts potentially; still, this does not 
apply to oxen. Conceptualists might reply that although oxen do not have categories or 
concepts and cannot experience the world as we – the concept bearers – do, they simply 
have a different experience of the world. But as Hannah astutely observes, some of Kant’s 
claims are not compatible with such an interpretation. According to Kant, representations 
we and animals or infants have are “of the same genus”. To this day, I have not found any 
replies by Kant’s strong conceptualist interpreters on how to account for this commitment.
However, even if we do not insist on the remark in the third Critique, the problem 
remains. Having in mind the criteria conceptualists have for perceptual experience, it 
seems that a “different perception of the animal” condemns the animal to the kingdom of 
determinism. In other words, to claim that animals and infants cannot have perceptions 
means to localize them in a deterministic nature rather than in the kingdom of ends. It 
would be hard to defend such a position today. Therefore, (1) if Kant claims that animals 
and infants can have perceptual experience, and (2) if it can be inferred that they expe-
rience the world in similar ways to us, and (3) if this view seems true about the state of 
affairs in the world (de re), then Kant’s claims used by Hanna should be incorporated 
into any good interpretation of Kant. By now, it seems that only anti-conceptualist and 
weak-conceptualist interpretations of Kant could do that.2
Another famous problem nonconceptualists rely on is Kant’s notion of incongruents. 
Incongruents are objects which share all conceptual predicates but still differ in regards 
2  For more on Kant and animal consciousness see Mclear (2011).
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to each other. Examples of them are left and right hands, left and right ears, and so on. 
In his recent paper, Hanna puts an argument from incongruents in the following way:
P1: Incongruent counterparts, like our right and left hands, by hypothesis, are such that they 
possess all their conceptually representable qualities in common, yet they still are essentially 
different because they are incongruent.
P2: This incongruence and the essential difference between our right and left hands is imme-
diately and veridically represented by human cognizers, but only by means of our empirical 
intuition of real objects in physical space and also our pure sensory intuition of the structure of 
space, as necessarily conforming to the form of our outer sensibility or intuition.
C: Therefore, our pure or non-empirical (hence a priori) representation of space is necessarily 
underdetermined by concepts”. (Hanna 2016: 108)
Thus, at least one class of objects – incongruents – is indiscernible by predicates repre-
sented by concepts. However, according to Kant, we have no problems in discerning them 
(in this case, our right and left hands) in our experience. Kant notes this in Prolegomena: 
“Now there are no inner differences here that any understanding could merely think; and 
yet the differences are inner as far as the senses teach” (Kant 2004: 37). This shows that 
Kant does not think that the entire scope of our experience is determined solely by the 
conceptual apparatus we have. Or, to put it differently, at least in some cases (like in the 
case of left and right hands) non-conceptual content defines the content of experience. 
Ergo, strong conceptualist interpretations of Kant seem wrong. Can a strong conceptualist 
interpretation explain how two phenomena with identical predicates expressed in concepts 
could be discerned? It is possible that some ad hoc decision could be found. However, 
for a strong conceptualist, it seems natural to claim that there can be no two phenomena 
sharing predicates because they would be one and the same object. But Hanna reminds 
us that Kant explicitly rejects this when he gives a list of works in which Kant employs 
the argument from incongruents (Hanna 2019: 109). These include both pre-critical and 
critical works. The works are “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intel-
ligible World” (known as “Inaugural dissertation”) (1770), “Prolegomena” (1783) [sic], 
“What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” (1786). Once again, according to 
Hanna, this shows, that for Kant “our pure or nonempirical representation of space picks 
out egocentrically centered, orientable, asymmetric structural topological properties of 
space that cannot be represented by the understanding and concepts” (Hanna, 2016: 108). 
Again, to my knowledge, the strong conceptualist interpreters of Kant have not given 
any answers to this, while the weak conceptualist interpreters of Kant, like van Mazijk, 
think that this argument is valid but compatible with the weak conceptualism (van Mazijk 
2014: 172-177).
An attentive reader has probably already noted that Kant’s argument from incongru-
ents is directed against Leibniz and the Wollfian school. In this case, it is not important if 
Kant’s argument is true and spatial predicates cannot be translated into conceptual ones, 
as it they often are in the contemporary debate on the identity of indiscernibles. What is 
important is that Kant’s non-conceptualist commitments are necessary for his debate with 
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Leibniz and the Wollfian school. The same idea is explicitly directed against Leibniz in 
“On The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection”. There Kant writes,
If an object is presented to us several times, but always with same inner determinations (quali-
tas et quantitas), then it is always exactly the same if it counts as an object of pure understand-
ing, not many but only one thing (numerica ideentitas); but if it is appearance, then the issue 
is not the comparison of concepts, but rather, however identical everything may be in regard 
to that, the difference of the places of these appearances at the same time is still an adequate 
ground for the numerical difference of the object (of the senses) itself. (Kant 1998: 368)
Kant’s argument seems to be pretty simple: if we think about aforementioned objects 
with regard to our understanding, then two objects with the same properties is one ob-
ject. However, if we talk about objects in experience, it is position in time and space that 
distinguishes these objects with regard to one another. Again, could this be explained by 
a strong conceptualist interpretation, one taking into account conceptual content? Would 
not Kant, as a strong conceptualist, be committing the same exact crime, of which he 
accuses Leibniz? Kant writes: “Lacking such a transcendental topic, and thus deceived by 
amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, the famous Leibniz … believed himself able to 
cognize the inner constitution of things by comparing all objects only with understanding 
and the abstract formal concepts of it is thinking” (Kant 1998: 371-2). Summa summarum, 
nonconceptualist commitments Kant takes and their role in his polemic with Leibniz puts 
the soundness of a strong conceptualist interpretation of Kant in strong doubt.
The Trouble with Causation
In spite of its many virtues, the nonconceptualist interpretation of Kant also exhibits 
critical flaws. The main one concerns Kant’s argument on causation. He presented this 
argument as central to the Critique of Pure Reason and is seen as such in most of analytic 
Kant scholarship. The problem, however, is that the nonconceptualist interpretation seems 
at odds with this argument. I will follow the summary of Kant’s argument as presented 
by Ginsborg (2008). Ginsborg argues that (1) in transcendental deduction, Kant wants to 
prove the universal and necessary validity of causation, that (2) Hume claims we cannot 
apply causation to perceived things because we do not have any experience of necessary 
relation, and that (3) “Kant’s strategy in response, again very crudely, is to claim that even 
though we have no sensory impression corresponding to the concept of causality, causality 
as necessary connection nonetheless figures in the content of perception” (Ginsborg 2008: 
70). This is true for Kant because all sense data are only given to us through the synthesis 
of perception, which works according to the rules of understanding. One of these rules is 
causation. As (4) causation must be universal and necessary, (5) “only by thus explaining 
‘the a priori validity of the category in regard to all objects of our senses’ will the aim of 
the deduction be fully attained” (Ginsborg 2008: 69). If this is the case, there could be 
no nonconceptual experience, because to this experience, the law of causation would not 
apply, and causation would lack universal validity. Or, put differently, all objects of ex-
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perience have to be determined by categories (at least to some extent), because causation 
(which is a category) is universal. 
Nonconceptualist interpreters propose two ways of getting out of this problem; as I 
argue below, both of them ultimately fail. Stefanie Grüne tries to show that Kant’s argument 
on causation does not necessarily imply that nonconceptualism is a wrong interpretation of 
Kant. According to her, “that we can have experiences of objects without possessing any 
of the concepts (if there are any) that characterize the experience’s content clearly does not 
imply that the object of the experience does not belong to the extension of any concepts” 
(Grüne 2008: 472). In other words, Grüne suggests us to have our cake and eat it too. 
We can be nonconceptualists and claim that our conceptual apparatus does not determine 
the perceptual content – but we can also be conceptualists and claim that the category of 
causation is applied to all objects of experience at the same time. The difference would 
be that of one’s knowledge: although it is given to me as nonconceptual, it actually falls 
under the extension of a category. This argument shows how psychologized Kant is in 
contemporary discussions. Grüne’s argument is invalid because for Kant, transcendental 
consciousness constitutes all experience of the empirical consciousness, regardless of 
the perspective of the empirical consciousness. If we have the concept of causality at 
the transcendental level, as Kant thinks we do, our knowledge of it is of absolutely no 
importance. We do not have to consciously apply the idea of causation in the constitution 
of perceptual experience, everything happens anonymously and by necessity. Braver puts 
this point beautifully when he states that “the ordering of experience is an autonomic 
process like regulating one’s heart rate that constantly operates in the background rather 
than an attitude consciously taken on” (Braver, 2007: 35). But even if Grüne were right, 
it would be hard to imagine what the object not synthesized according to the categories 
would look like, given that it could be neither one, nor real, nor caused, nor self-subsistent 
(as all these are categories). As Kant famously puts it, such an object would be “less than 
a dream” (Kant 1998: 235). 
Hanna offers another way out: in his view of Kant, concepts are only necessary for 
the experience which grounds valid judgments (Hanna 2005: 257).3 As Hanna sees it, the 
object of the first Critique is the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. This allegedly 
allows the claim that our everyday perception, which does not aim at grounding objec-
tive knowledge, is outside of the scope of the first Critique itself. Hence, Hanna tries to 
convince the reader that Kant simply does not talk about everyday sense experience at 
all (ibid). If that is true, it may just be that the everyday sense experience, which does not 
have to be a part of our scientific endeavor, does not necessarily have to be determined 
by our conceptual apparatus. And yet there are a few reasons to drop this argument. First 
of all, as van Mazijk reminds us, nowhere does Kant claim “that there is a special sort of 
receptive sense making that could do without synthesis” (van Mazijk 2014: 192). Secondly, 
Hanna’s distinction between everyday sense experience and an epistemically oriented one 
3  Hanna uses the word “experience” in a broader sense than Kant. For Kant, the experience is always objective 
and epistemically oriented. 
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means that categories do not apply to the entire spectrum of possible experience. This 
would mean that we could have experience of natural processes to which the category of 
causation would not apply. Such a conclusion is irreconcilable with Kantian commitments 
described above; hence it should be dropped. In other words, although Kant is first and 
foremost in epistemic subject, his argument requires the epistemic conditions to hold in 
all experience. Therefore, the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic life of the 
subject in regard to perception cannot be made. 
At the end of the presentation of the nonconceptualist interpretation of Kant, we are 
left in a strange situation. On the one hand, nonconceptualist interpretations cannot explain 
Kant’s arguments against Hume, while conceptualism cannot explain Kant’s anti-Leibni-
zian stance. On the other, both are necessary for the first Critique to work. Thus, it appears 
that both interpretations can explain only a part of the Critique of Pure Reason and are 
one-sided. Therefore, if a weak conceptualist interpretation could accommodate both 
moments in a coherent way, it would be preferable to the other two. Consequently, I hope 
the reader will agree that weak conceptualism is the only game in town.4 What remains to 
be done, then, is to discuss how the weak conceptualist reading of Kant can maintain the 
specificity of his transcendental philosophy. This is the task of the last part of the paper.
Categories and the Weak Conceptualism 
The interpreter who argues that Kant is a weak conceptualist has to provide an inter-
pretation, according to which concepts always play a role in the experience but do not 
necessarily define it. There have been various attempts to achieve this. Van Mazijk, 
for example, uses a distinction between the general and the real content of experience 
from Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Mazijk 2014: 192-194). The general content of 
experience is the “what” that is given in experience, while the real content is “how” this 
“what” is given. According to this distinction, one can have an intuition of one and the 
same table (general content), but, depending on their position in space, light conditions, 
and so on, the table will be given in different ways, or in husserlese, in different profiles. 
According to Van Mazijk, Kant is a conceptualist regarding the general content and a 
nonconceptualist regarding the real one. Although I agree with Van Mazijk in general, I 
doubt that an interpretation based on the distinction that Kant never made is sufficient to 
convince the opposing camps – indeed, the use of this distinction seems quite arbitrary. 
Forgione avoids this problem by grounding his interpretation of Kant in the “theory of 
a transcendental object” (Forgione 2015). His weak conceptualist interpretation agrees 
that for Kant, everything we experience is objects (in the widest sense of the term), and 
that this feature of our experience, namely, that all phenomena are objects, is constituted 
by the categories of understanding. Therefore, in all experience, categories are at work. 
Still, in some cases this categorical determination does not go beyond a bare minimum 
of determining the experienced thing as an object. Believing that Kant grounds experi-
4  Of course, I presuppose that Kant’s philosophy is consistent.
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ence in indexicals, Forgione argues that phenomena can be determined simply as “this” 
or “that”. However, contra Kripke, Forgione maintains that Kant thinks of indexicals as 
a conceptual relation: “The concept of the transcendental object is, therefore, a pointer, 
although conceptual rather than relational by definition” (Forgione 2015: 55). I think this 
option is preferable to Van Mazijks, as Forgione employs Kant’s own conceptual tool. 
However, the theory of a transcendental object seems to be of rather secondary importance 
when compared to A and B deductions strong conceptualist analyze, or the transcendental 
aesthetics on which nonconceptualists rely.
Therefore, I propose that the ground for a well-argued and convincing weak concep-
tualist interpretation of Kant is rather the distinction between categories and empirical 
concepts (which is simply Kant’s technical name for words). The basic claim here is that 
categories simply do not denote language processes. Although I will only provide an outline 
of this distinction in this paper, I think it will be sufficient for the reader to understand the 
role it plays in this debate. To ground the weak conceptualist reading of Kant I offer in 
this paper, below I compare categories and empirical concepts along their role as rules. 
It is important to keep in mind that I do not investigate whether this Kantian distinction 
is philosophically defendable per se (and probably it is not).  
1. In the second edition of the first Critique, Kant is clear on the fact that he draws 
categories directly from the table of judgements: “The same function that gives unity to the 
different representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different 
representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of 
understanding” (Kant 1998: 211). Following Kant, if understanding is responsible for 
both judgements and categories, then for every type of judgement there has to be a cor-
responding category. I do not consider this a convincing argument. As Hegel reminds us 
again and again, Kant simply borrows categories and judgements from logic textbooks and 
does not bother to prove why the specific number of categories he uses – or any concrete 
number for that matter – should exhaust the categorical space.5 It is important to notice 
that Kant defines categories as functions of unity,6 or (and that is the same) a synthesis 
of the manifold in intuition (ibid). However, Kant does not have a whole lot to say about 
empirical concepts. It is a well-known fact that Kant did not develop any detailed phi-
5  “In the customary treatment of logic, a variety of classifications and species of concepts are adduced. It im-
mediately strikes one as inconsequential that the species are introduced in this way: ‘There are, as regards quality, 
quantity, etc., the following concepts.’ The ‘there are’ conveys no other justification than that we find the named 
species and that they show up in experience. What we have in this manner is an empirical logic – an odd science 
indeed, an irrational cognition of the rational. In this the logic sets a very bad precedent for compliance to its own 
teaching; it allows itself to do the opposite of what it prescribes as a rule, namely, that concepts should be derived, 
and scientific propositions (therefore also the proposition: ‘There are such and such species of concepts’) demon-
strated. – In this context, the Kantian philosophy incurs a further inconsequence by borrowing the categories for the 
transcendental logic, as so-called root concepts, from the subjective logic where they were assumed empirically.37 
Since the Kantian philosophy admits the latter fact, it is hard to see why transcendental logic resorts to borrowing 
from such a science rather than directly helping itself from experience” (Hegel 2010: 541). 
6  Kant uses the word Einheit, which translates directly into oneness, not unity.
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losophy of language.7 We can infer that Kant, much as late Wittgenstein, thought that the 
primary and the most important bit of language is a sentence (judgement), and not a word. 
This view is attributed to Kant by Robert Brandom, when he claims that “Kant takes the 
whole judgment to be the conceptually and explanatorily basic unit at once of meaning, 
cognition, awareness, and experience” (Brandom, 2009: 33).
2. Kant presents categories as the most basic rules according to which experience (in 
the Kantian sense) must be ordered (Kant 1998: 231-232). Empirical concepts are also 
rules we use to sort our experiences. For example, when we call the appearance a table, 
we relate it to countless other objects (other tables) and differentiate it from even more 
appearances (not tables). The word “table” then becomes a rule on how to relate and 
differentiate phenomena. In this way, Kant avoids the problems characteristic to the early 
modern philosophy related with the likeness of ideas and things (consider Berkeley’s 
critique of Locke). If the idea of “red” denotes the color red, is it itself red, and if not, 
on what ground does it denote red? In the model of concepts-as-rules, this problem does 
not arise. The rules of chess do not have to look like a chessboard or Gary Kasparov.
3. If both categories and empirical concepts are rules, then what distinguishes them? 
I frame the main difference as follows: the categories, for example, unity, reality or ne-
cessity, do not provide the identity conditions for objects. As such, they do not provide 
us with rules for differentiating objects either. Or, to put it in other words, conditions of 
the possibility of knowledge do not themselves provide any knowledge whatsoever. If 
you propose that an object is one, possible, or real, you do not know anything about this 
particular object, because all objects of experience share these predicates. In his book 
Goodbye, Kant!, Maurizio Ferraris reminds us that this is the exact meaning of the word 
“transcendental”:
Perhaps for us, the word “transcendental” seems like a Kantian term of art, a neologism that 
is now a bit long in the tooth, dating as it does to the eighteenth century. But in point of fact, 
the tooth is a fossil: the medieval Schoolmen, building on Boethius (ca. 480-526), already had 
their transcendental or, rather, their transcendentals. In their account of logic, the transcenden-
tals are the features of objects that are so general as to be broader in scope than the categories 
themselves, because they apply to all objects whatsoever. Unlike the categories, they do not 
classify anything whatsoever because they list the properties of any being whatsoever. (Fer-
raris 2013: 25)
Without a doubt, Kant drops such transcendentals as “Good”. He also thinks of them 
as structures of the transcendental subject rather than being itself, but for Kant, as in me-
dieval scholasticism, they still “do not classify anything”. However, the case is different 
with empirical concepts: to say that the table is brown is to know something about the 
world. Yet another way to put it is this: categories provide the conditions of possibility of 
“what-it-is”, while empirical concepts supply the descriptions of “what-it-is.” In this way, 
categories are conditions of the possibility of language but do not completely determine it. 
7  For more on this see Forster (2012).
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Conclusions
Having shown the difference between the categories and the empirical concepts, I can 
finally present how the distinction between them can ground the interpretation of Kant 
as a weak conceptualist. First, I acknowledge that a strong conceptualist is right in that 
categories are at work in all and every experience. They constitute the unity and reality 
of appearance, their succession in time (causality), and so on. However, I also agree with 
Hanna that neither categories nor empirical concepts alone determine the content of ex-
perience Kant’s sense. For Kant, a person can easily decide whether he sees the right or 
the left hand because of the nonconceptual content of experience. However, the fact that 
instead of the stream of content from my five senses (the Kantian “manifold of intuition”) 
I see a unified object, is due to the work of categories. What is more important still is that 
the distinction between categories and empirical concepts both shows how Kant thinks 
he has answered Hume and makes his critique of Leibnizian metaphysics intelligible. 
Arguing against the former, Kant shows that every phenomenon is organized according 
to the categories (thus providing the conditions of possibility of “what-it-is”), therefore, 
causality is necessary. Arguing against the latter, he maintains that nonconceptual content 
helps discern phenomena with otherwise identical conceptual content (providing concrete 
determinations of what a thing is). This also helps to explain how infants and animals can 
experience the world – although they do not possess language, this does not mean that 
infants and animals do not possess categories, as these are not identical with language.
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